

Set	Items	Description
S1	2	AU={WURMAN P? OR WURMAN, P?}
S2	2486	AUCTION? OR META AUCTION? OR MULTIAUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR REVERSEAUCTION? OR INVERSEAUCTION
S3	691278	ALGORITHM? OR ALGORYTHM? OR FORMULA? OR MECHANISM?
S4	852268	COMPUTES OR COMPUTING OR CALCULAT? OR COMPUTE OR DETERMIN? OR ALLOCAT? OR APPORTION?
S5	18671	(BUNDL? OR GROUP? ? OR COMPLIMENTAR? OR NUMBER OR COLLECTI- ON)(5N)(COMMODIT? OR ITEM? ? OR PRODUCT? ? WARES OR EQUIPMENT? OR MERCHANDI?)
S6	696952	PRICE? OR COST? OR CHARG? OR BID OR BIDS OR OFFER? ?
S7	599382	INTERIM OR PROGRESSIVE? OR TEMPORAR? OR CURRENT?
S8	20760	WIN OR WINS OR WON OR WINNING
S9	1469	S4(10N)S5
S10	20	S9(S)S2
S11	172	S5(S)S2
S12	412	S8(2N)S6
S13	21	S12(S)S5
S14	15706	S3(5N)S6
S15	59	S14(S)S5
S16	41	S11(20N)(S3 OR S4)
S17	107	S10 OR S13 OR S15 OR S16
S18	65	S17 AND IC=G06F-017/60

? show file

File 348:EUROPEAN PATENTS 1978-2003/Oct W01

(c) 2003 European Patent Office

File 349:PCT FULLTEXT 1979-2002/UB=20031002,UT=20030925

(c) 2003 WIPO/Univentio

09/420,258

Set	Items	Description
S1	29	AU=(WURMAN P? OR WURMAN, P?)
S2	25020	AUCTION? OR META AUCTION? OR MULTIAUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR REVERSEAUCTION? OR INVERSEAUCTION
S3	1509971	ALGORITHM? OR ALGORYTHM? OR FORMULA? OR MECHANISM?
S4	2832721	COMPUTES OR COMPUTING OR CALCULAT? OR COMPUTE OR DETERMIN? OR ALLOCAT? OR APPORTION?
S5	13137	(BUNDL? OR GROUP? ? OR COMPLIMENTAR? OR NUMBER OR COLLECTI- ON) (5N) (COMMODIT? OR ITEM? ? OR PRODUCT? ? WARES OR EQUIPMENT? OR MERCHANDI?)
S6	2219246	PRICE? OR COST? OR CHARG? OR BID OR BIDS OR OFFER? ?
S7	1231895	INTERIM OR PROGRESSIVE? OR TEMPORAR? OR CURRENT?
S8	202748	WIN OR WINS OR WON OR WINNING
S9	86	S2 AND S5
S10	0	S1 AND S9
S11	31	S9 AND (S3 OR S4)
S12	2	S1 AND S2 AND S7
S13	11	S11 NOT PY>2000
S14	11	RD (unique items)
S15	13	S14 OR S12

? show file

File 2:INSPEC 1969-2003/Sep W4
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(c) 2003, EBSCO Pub.

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(c) 2003 The New York Times

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File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods. 82-2003/Sep
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15/5/1 (Item 1 from file: 2)

DIALOG(R)File 2:INSPEC

(c) 2003 Institution of Electrical Engineers. All rts. reserv.

7073946 INSPEC Abstract Number: C2001-12-1290D-050

Title: Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions

Author(s): Lavi, R.; Nisan, N.

Author Affiliation: Inst. of Comput. Sci., Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel

Conference Title: EC'00. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce p.233-41

Publisher: ACM, New York, NY, USA

Publication Date: 2000 Country of Publication: USA vii+271 pp.

ISBN: 1 58113 272 7 Material Identity Number: XX-2000-02428

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 1 58113 272 7/2000/0010..\$5.00

Conference Title: Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00)

Conference Sponsor: ACM

Conference Date: 17-20 Oct. 2000 Conference Location: Minneapolis, MN, USA

Language: English Document Type: Conference Paper (PA)

Treatment: Economic aspects (E); Theoretical (T)

Abstract: This paper studies **auctions** in a setting where the different bidders arrive at different times and the **auction mechanism** is required to make decisions about each bid as it is received. Such settings occur in computerized **auction** of computational resources as well as in other settings. We call such **auctions** on-line **auctions**. We first characterize exactly on-line **auctions** that are incentive competitive, ie, where rational bidders are always motivated to bid their true valuation. We then embark on a competitive worst-case analysis of incentive-compatible on-line **auctions**. We obtain several results, the cleanest of which is an incentive-compatible on-line **auction** for a large number of identical **items**. This **auction** has an optimal competitive ratio, both in terms of seller's revenue and in terms of the total social efficiency obtained. (26 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: electronic commerce; optimisation

Identifiers: competitive analysis; on-line **auctions**; bidders; computerized **auction**; computational resources; incentive-compatible on-line **auctions**; optimal competitive ratio; seller revenue; social efficiency

Class Codes: C1290D (Systems theory applications in economics and business); C1180 (Optimisation techniques)

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15/5/2 (Item 2 from file: 2)

DIALOG(R)File 2:INSPEC

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7073924 INSPEC Abstract Number: C2001-12-1290D-040

Title: AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction

Author(s): Wurman, P.R.; Wellman, M.P.

Author Affiliation: North Carolina State Univ., Raleigh, NC, USA

Conference Title: EC'00. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce p.21-9

Publisher: ACM, New York, NY, USA

Publication Date: 2000 Country of Publication: USA vii+271 pp.

ISBN: 1 58113 272 7 Material Identity Number: XX-2000-02428

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 1 58113 272 7/2000/0010..\$5.00

Conference Title: Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00)

Conference Sponsor: ACM

Conference Date: 17-20 Oct. 2000 Conference Location: Minneapolis, MN, USA

Language: English Document Type: Conference Paper (PA)

Treatment: Economic aspects (E); Theoretical (T)

Abstract: The allocation of discrete, complementary resources is a fundamental problem in economics and of direct interest to E-commerce applications. Combinatorial **auctions** account for complementarities by optimizing over offers expressed in terms of bundles. **Progressive** versions of combinatorial **auctions** alleviate the burden on bidders of expressing offers for all bundles of interest by providing **interim** feedback based on partial sets of bids. Feedback in terms of hypothetical prices is particularly useful, as it directs bidders toward those bundles potentially yielding the greatest surplus. For a general class of discrete resource allocation problems with free disposal, we establish by construction the existence of competitive equilibrium prices on bundles that support the efficient allocation. We introduce AkBA, a family of **progressive auctions** that use these equilibrium bundle prices. We examine a particular instance of the family, called AlBA, and present some empirical data on its performance. (26 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: combinatorial mathematics; costing; economics; electronic commerce; optimisation

Identifiers: AkBA; **progressive combinatorial auction**; anonymous-price combinatorial **auction**; economics; E-commerce; offer optimization; bundles; **interim** feedback; partial bid sets; discrete resource allocation; free disposal; competitive equilibrium prices; performance

Class Codes: C1290D (Systems theory applications in economics and business); C1160 (Combinatorial mathematics); C1180 (Optimisation techniques)

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15/5/3 (Item 3 from file: 2)

DIALOG(R) File 2:INSPEC

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6469726 INSPEC Abstract Number: B2000-02-6250B-018

Title: **Frequency reuse and system deployment in local multipoint distribution service**

Author(s): Roman, V.I.

Author Affiliation: ADC Telecommun. Inc., Minneapolis, MN, USA

Journal: IEEE Personal Communications vol.6, no.6 p.20-7

Publisher: IEEE,

Publication Date: Dec. 1999 Country of Publication: USA

CODEN: IPCME7 ISSN: 1070-9916

SICI: 1070-9916(199912)6:6L:20:FRSD;1-X

Material Identity Number: B467-2000-001

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 1070-9916/99/\$10.00

Language: English Document Type: Journal Paper (JP)

Treatment: Theoretical (T)

Abstract: Following the FCC's **auctions** for local multipoint distribution service spectrum, the US spectrum holders are expected to go on a rapid move, first toward evaluating the technology in trials; and further toward gradual deployment and commercial availability. The LMDS spectrum will offer new ways to break the local loop bottleneck by delivering a full suite of high-speed service interfaces to business and residential customers. The problem for developers and operators consists in

how to efficiently exploit the wide amount of available spectrum for LMDS against challenges such as the propagation characteristics, and the availability and cost of radio technology at millimeter waves. This article presents some of the alternatives and options related to the efficient deployment of LMDS. It starts with a presentation of the duplexing techniques and their specific trade-off and applicability in LMDS. Further on, we consider the subject of frequency planning and reuse. This consists of an overview of the basic **mechanisms** and **algorithms** involved, links to related topics in mobile cellular systems, and architectures for reuse optimization in LMDS. Of special interest is the issue of LMDS deployment for gradual capacity upswing, starting with low investment in **equipment** and a low **number** of cells and sectors, and going toward more cells with higher capacity per cell. To serve this problem a novel approach to the use of alternative polarization in gradually increasing capacity and sectorization is presented. To justify the target of high capacity and bandwidth utilization, an example of capacity estimation is also given. (18 Refs)

Subfile: B

Descriptors: business communication; cellular radio; channel capacity; electromagnetic wave polarisation; frequency **allocation** ; millimetre wave propagation; optimisation; radio access networks

Identifiers: frequency reuse; system deployment; local multipoint distribution service; FCC **auctions** ; local multipoint distribution service spectrum; US spectrum holders; LMDS spectrum; high-speed service interfaces ; business customers; residential customers; network operators; network developers; propagation characteristics; availability; cost; radio technology; millimeter waves; duplexing techniques; frequency planning; **algorithms** ; mobile cellular systems; reuse optimization; capacity per cell ; bandwidth utilization; alternating polarization; sectorization; capacity estimation

Class Codes: B6250B (Radio access systems); B6220B (Subscriber loops); B6250F (Mobile radio systems); B6410 (Legislation, frequency allocation and spectrum pollution); B0260 (Optimisation techniques); B5210C (Radiowave propagation)

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15/5/4 (Item 4 from file: 2)

DIALOG(R)File 2:INSPEC

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5556422 INSPEC Abstract Number: C9705-1290D-101

Title: An optimal auction for complements

Author(s): Levin, J.

Author Affiliation: Dept. of Econ., MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA

Journal: Games and Economic Behavior vol.18, no.2 p.176-92

Publisher: Academic Press,

Publication Date: Feb. 1997 Country of Publication: USA

CODEN: GEBEEF ISSN: 0899-8256

SICI: 0899-8256(199702)18:2L.176:OAC;1-3

Material Identity Number: N737-97003

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 0899-8256/97/\$25.00

Language: English Document Type: Journal Paper (JP)

Treatment: Theoretical (T)

Abstract: This paper considers the optimal selling **mechanism** for complementary items. When buyers are perfectly symmetric, the optimal procedure is to **bundle** the **items** and run a standard **auction** . In general, however, **bundling** the **items** is not necessarily desirable, and the standard **auctions** do not maximize revenue. Moreover, the optimal **auction allocation** may not be socially efficient since the **auction**

must discriminate against bidders who have strong incentives to misrepresent their true preferences. (22 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: economic cybernetics; optimisation

Identifiers: optimal selling **mechanism** ; complementary items; perfectly symmetric buyers; optimal **auction allocation** ; social efficiency; preference misrepresentation

Class Codes: C1290D (Systems theory applications in economics and business); C1180 (Optimisation techniques)

Copyright 1997, IEE

15/5/5 (Item 1 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online

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01801808 ORDER NO: AADAA-I9942563

ECONOMIC AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF AUCTION -BASED ONLINE MERCANTILE PROCESSES

Author: BAPNA, RAVI

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1999

Corporate Source/Institution: THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT (0056)

Adviser: PAULO B. GOES

Source: VOLUME 60/08-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 3000. 100 PAGES

Descriptors: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, GENERAL ; MASS COMMUNICATIONS ; ECONOMICS, COMMERCE-BUSINESS

Descriptor Codes: 0310; 0708; 0505

Traditionally, the posted-price based electronic catalog process has served as the **mechanism** of choice for conducting electronic commerce activity on the web. Increasingly, *business auctions* are gaining popularity as an efficient and flexible on-line mercantile channel. We characterize the various dimensions of online **auctions** and focus our attention on the business-to-consumer (*B2C*) dimension. Typically, such **auctions** sell multiple-units of identical products. However, much of traditional **auction** theory has focussed on analyzing single-item **auctions**. We demonstrate the lack of applicability of single-item results in multi-item settings. We derive a general expression that characterizes the multiple equilibria that can arise in such **auctions** and segregate these into desirable and undesirable categories. Additionally, we show that number of such equilibria grows combinatorially with the **number** of **items** being sold.

Using empirical data from real-world online **auctions** we sift through the multitude of decision variables that **auctioneers** could control and identify the bid-increment as the key revenue impacting one.

We also present the first ever categorization of consumer bidding strategies in online **auctions**, and study the interaction between the bid-increment and such strategies. With a motive of providing concrete strategic directions to online **auctioneers** we derive an upper bound beyond which the bid-increment should not be set. Empirical evidence shows in retrospect that setting a bid increment higher than the upper bound has a negative impact on **auctioneer**'s revenue. Finally, we discuss a controlled laboratory experiment that utilizes salient monetary incentives and allows us to further test our analytical and empirical findings.

15/5/6 (Item 2 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online

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01467904 ORDER NO: AADAA-I9606237

ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC PROJECTS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE (DOUBLE ORAL AUCTION MARKET, TRADE LINKS, VALUATION SYSTEM)

Author: HAHN, KYUNG DONG

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1995

Corporate Source/Institution: VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY (0247)

Chairman: ROBERT P. GILES

Source: VOLUME 56/11-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.
PAGE 4481. 120 PAGES

Descriptors: ECONOMICS, GENERAL ; SOCIOLOGY, PUBLIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Descriptor Codes: 0501; 0630

This dissertation concerns economies with public projects. Public projects are a special case of public goods in which size is not necessarily measured by units and which are either built at some fixed cost or not built at all. Our theoretical studies of public projects are based on personalized prices for access to the public project rather than personalized prices for the units consumed of public goods as in the literature on Lindahl equilibrium. Furthermore, the private provision of public projects is experimentally investigated with a double oral **auction** market for assets that are required in order to produce public projects.

The first paper, "Economies with Multiple Public Projects" (joint work with Robert P. Gilles), discusses an economy with multiple public projects each separately produced by a distinct provider operating under a different cost function. In an economy with the non-Euclidean representation of multiple public projects space we show that the two welfare theorems hold for valuation equilibria in which a public project is financed through a (non-linear) system of taxes or subsidies, called a valuation system, and that the core **allocations** are equivalent to the set of valuation equilibria with a nonnegative valuation system.

The second paper, "Market Provision of Public Projects: Some Experimental Results" (joint work with Sheryl B. Ball), presents experimental evidence on the provision of a public project which is produced by a coalition of economic agents in the population. A double oral **auction** asset market is employed as the trading institution for assets that are required in order to produce the public project. The experimental environments differ by rules about who can produce the project, information about the benefits to the other agents of the project, and parameters which include the symmetry and size of individual valuations of the assets and the magnitude of social benefits from the project. We find that individually rational efficient outcomes which are identified by a theoretical analysis based on Chapter 2, are more likely in some environments than others, and suggest that these findings may have implications for the usefulness of this **mechanism** for public project provision.

The third paper, "Economies with Costly Trade Links," is an application of the model of economies with public projects to the case of an economy with endogenous formation of costly trade links between industries in different sectors of the economy. The trade links reduce transaction costs, but inevitably incur set-up costs. We prove that the two welfare theorems hold for trade equilibria in which each trade link is separately financed with budget neutrality as well as profit maximization.

The fourth paper, "Efficiency and Egalitarian-Equivalence in Economies with a Public Project" (joint work with Robert P. Gilles), is an application of the model of economies with public projects to the equity concept of egalitarian-equivalence. An **allocation** is egalitarian-equivalent if there exists a fixed **commodity bundle** (the

same for each agent) that is considered by each agent to be indifferent to the bundle that he/she actually gets in the **allocation** under consideration. A public project is also produced by a coalition of economic agents as in Chapter 3. We prove that there exist efficient egalitarian-equivalent **allocations**, which are not equivalent to the set of valuation equilibria and also may not be in the core. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

15/5/7 (Item 3 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R) File 35:Dissertation Abs Online
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927274 ORDER NO: NOT AVAILABLE FROM UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS INT'L.
TWO ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: I. WEIGHTED UTILITY, RISK AVERSION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE. II. COMPETITIVE BIDDING AND INTEREST RATE FORMATION IN AN INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKET

Author: MAO, MEI HUI JENNIFER

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1985

Corporate Source/Institution: THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
(CANADA) (2500)

Source: VOLUME 47/06-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.
PAGE 2221.

Descriptors: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, GENERAL

Descriptor Codes: 0310

This thesis consists of two essays. Each essay addresses a research problem involving some aspects of uncertainty and financial economics. Essay I deals with the general question of whether classical results in risk aversion and portfolio choice based on expected utility hypothesis are robust with respect to recent works in nonlinear utility theories generalizing expected utility. We investigate the implications of an axiomatic generalization called weighted utility theory along with the weaker, but unaxiomatized linear Gateaux utility.

We establish the equivalence among three definitions of individual global risk aversion, i.e., in terms of conditional certainty equivalent, mean preserving spread, and conditional risky-asset demand. The only requirement is that the preference ordering be complete, transitive, consistent with first-degree stochastic dominance, and continuous in distribution. The equivalence between the first two definitions is also extended to a comparative context.

We also identify the necessary and sufficient condition for the single risky asset to be a normal good to a weighted utility maximizer with concave lottery-specific utility functions.

The second essay examines the role of a sequential competitive bidding process in the endogenous **determination** of interest rates and the corresponding **allocation** of loans and savings in a widely observed class of informal financial markets called the 'rotating credit association'. Optimal bidding strategies are obtained for individual agents with concave and time-additive utility functions.

After deriving some comparative statics and efficiency implications of the individual optimal bidding strategy, we impose further restrictions, including risk neutrality, to obtain a tractable form of a Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. This yields, for each agent, and ex post borrowing, as well as lending, interest rate depending on the history of the realized winning bids, including the one for the period in which he won the **auction**. Weighted by the Nash equilibrium-induced probability of winning in each period, ex ante borrowing and lending interest rates result.

The rotating credit association bidding model is then applied to a tacit collusion among a small group of sellers in a sequential bidding setting where a single agent purchases, at regular intervals, via sealed bid **auctions**, an indivisible **commodity** from a fixed **group** of eligible sellers. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.)

15/5/8 (Item 4 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online
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913990 ORDER NO: AAD86-03652

ESSAYS ON COORDINATION OF INDIVISIBLE RESOURCES AND LEONTIEF TECHNOLOGIES

Author: JAIKUMAR, RAMCHANDRAN

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1985

Corporate Source/Institution: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (0175)

Source: VOLUME 47/02-B OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 767. 234 PAGES

Descriptors: OPERATIONS RESEARCH

Descriptor Codes: 0796

In this dissertation we apply the analytical framework of Integer Programming to the economics of resource **allocation** with indivisibilities in Leontief technologies. This research was motivated by two seemingly unrelated problems in transportation economics. The first problem has arisen with airline deregulation and requires a central agency to assign landing rights at congested airports among competing airlines. The second problem is faced by a firm that must schedule a fleet of vehicles to efficiently transport goods.

The dissertation consists of three parts:

In the first part, we develop the foundations of a theory of rational procedures. We examine existing notions of equity and efficiency within the neo-classical economic framework and introduce some new ideas on how they may be evaluated and measured. Starting with a very general axiomatic foundation for rational procedures, we carefully examine the axioms within the context of the economic environment we wish to study--specifically, the **allocation** of landing rights. We build on the axioms and develop a concept of Integer Equilibrium. The new equilibrium concept can be viewed as a solution for an n-person non-cooperative game where the **commodity bundles** are integral. The interesting feature of the equilibrium is that we obtain a vector of prices for discrete possibilities. The properties of this equilibrium are then studied with respect to substantive notions of stability, efficiency, and equity.

In the second part of the dissertation, we use the new theoretical concepts to develop resource **allocation** procedures for a wide range of economic environments: **auctions**, markets, cooperatives and firms. We introduce a new theory of complementary good **auctions** for bundles of goods. **Auction mechanisms** similar to the English **Auction** and the Dutch **Auction** are studied. We propose a variety of **mechanisms** and examine their properties. In studying markets, we consider trades where the technologies are Leontief and commodities are indivisible. We consider a special case of a Leontief technology, the generalized assignment model, and study it in detail. We develop an **algorithm** for this model and compare its computational efficiency with other solution methods.

The third part of the dissertation deals with applications. We apply the procedures we developed to the two problems which motivated this dissertation: the problem of **allocating** landing rights and the scheduling of a fleet of vehicles. We examine each of the problems in detail and

critically review other proposals for solving them. We can then show how the procedures we have developed can be used. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.)

15/5/9 (Item 1 from file: 65)

DIALOG(R) File 65: Inside Conferences

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03620942 INSIDE CONFERENCE ITEM ID: CN038142653

AkBA: A Progressive , Anonymous-Price Combinatorial Auction

Wurman, P. R. ; Wellman, M. P.

CONFERENCE: Electronic commerce-Conference; 2nd

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 2000; 2ND P:
21-29

ACM Press, 2000

ISBN: 1581132727

LANGUAGE: English DOCUMENT TYPE: Conference Papers

CONFERENCE SPONSOR: Association for Computing Machinery

CONFERENCE LOCATION: Minneapolis, MN 2000; Oct (200010) (200010)

BRITISH LIBRARY ITEM LOCATION: 6836.150300

DESCRIPTORS: EC; electronic commerce; ACM

15/5/10 (Item 1 from file: 583)

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06683255

Sharp differences among chaebols delay agreement on restructuring

SOUTH KOREA: MERGING OF UNITS BY CONGLOMERATES

The Korea Herald (XBF) 03 Sep 1998 P.1

Language: ENGLISH

South Korean top five conglomerates - Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG and SK - have made some agreements on restructuring of their businesses. In the petrochemicals industry, the groups will create two separate management firms in Ulsan and Yeochon of South Cholla province. In the train coach and aerospace industries, the groups will set up two single consortiums. In the oil refining industry, Hyundai Oil Co should acquire the oil refining unit of Hanwha Energy Co. In the semiconductor industry, the groups are **determined** to merge three chip makers into two players by combining LG Semicon and Hyundai Electronics Industries Co. However, the two chip makers cannot agree on who will hold the controlling stake in the combined firm. In the power-generation **equipment** industry, Hyundai **Group** strongly objected to plans to combine three local players into the soon-to-be-privatised Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co, or Hanjung. Automakers were excluded from the initial stage of the big deal due to the cancellation of the international **auction** for Kia Motors Corp. COMPANY: KIA MOTORS; HANJUNG; KOREA HEAVY INDUSTRIES & CONSTRUCTION; HYUNDAI ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; LG SEMICON; HANWHA ENERGY; HYUNDAI OIL; SK; LG; DAEWOO; SAMSUNG; HYUNDAI

PRODUCT: Oil (2910); Organic Chemicals (2860); Motor Vehicles & Parts (3710); Railway Equipment (3740); Aircraft & Parts (3720); Semiconductor Devices (3674); Civil Engineering (1600CE); Electricity Generation (4911);

EVENT: Acquisitions & Mergers (15);

COUNTRY: South Korea (9SOK);

15/5/11 (Item 2 from file: 583)
DIALOG(R) File 583:Gale Group Globalbase(TM)
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05925424
Extensive reforms predicted for trade
CHINA : FOREIGN TRADE REFORMS
China Daily (XKP) 30 Dec 1993 p.1
Language: ENGLISH

A series of reform include changes in the taxation, finance, investment, State planning and foreign-exchange administration sectors controlled by State Council is to set up a foreign-trade **mechanism** that is consonate with int'l economic norms. - China will further perfect macro-control over its foreign trade .The State will exert control over a small **number** of **commodities** suited to public bidding for quotas, **auctions** and regularised distribution. - China will explore ways to combine trade with industry, agriculture, technology and commerce. Foreign-trade rights will be granted to certain enterprises to meet State requirements. - China will perfect a foreign-trade co-ordination service system and give full play to chambers of commerce which deal with import and export. - China will maintain unified State foreign-trade policies and pormote transparency. *

COMPANY: STATE COUNCIL
PRODUCT: National Government (9100);
EVENT: Government Domestic Functions (97);
COUNTRY: China (9CHN);

15/5/12 (Item 1 from file: 256)
DIALOG(R) File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.
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00121965 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: Printing & Graphic Arts (830416); Internet Shopping (840432)

TITLE: Sampling the Site Features: Everything a printer needs, plus handy...

AUTHOR: Tooth, Debora
SOURCE: Graphic Arts Monthly, v71 n12 pS5(3) Dec 1999
ISSN: 1047-9325
HOMEPAGE: <http://www.gammag.com>

RECORD TYPE: Review
REVIEW TYPE: Product Analysis
GRADE: Product Analysis, No Rating

www.PrintNation.com, an e-commerce superstore that works with over 40 warehouses to distribute products to printers, allows users to search for and order printing supplies and devices. PrintNation also provides financing, service, training, and printing equipment **auctions** via the Web. The CEO of PrintNation says a generic online shopping network in which print industry participants can quickly shop and find bargains is of great advantage to those in a highly competitive industry with close margins and dynamic environments. PrintNation's Store offers over 100,000 products from 1,300 manufacturers, including paper, ink, film, plates, computers, and

peripherals; presses are not sold. Products are categorized, and a Hot Deals area provides many sale items. A PowerSearch area looks for **items** by manufacturer, **equipment** part **number**, or keyword, and ground shipping is thrown in at no additional cost. Users can apply for credit online, and a printer can be approved for up to \$50,000 in four hours. Information about leasing as opposed to purchasing can also be viewed, and a quick quote and payment **calculator** are provided. Service is included in the price of larger equipment and includes installation, configuration, and training provided by Tech Services International. Printers who want to reorder can enter a user name and password and access the secure portion of PrintNation. PrintNation's features and operation are described in detail.

COMPANY NAME: Vendor Independent (999999)
SPECIAL FEATURE: Screen Layouts
DESCRIPTORS: Internet Marketing; Internet Shopping; Office Products; Part Ordering; Printing & Graphic Arts; Purchasing
REVISION DATE: 20001230

15/5/13 (Item 2 from file: 256)
DIALOG(R) File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.
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00114290 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: **Excite Auctions (594113); Yahoo! Auctions (584622); atAuction (736406); eBay (736414)**

TITLE: **Bidding Frenzy**
AUTHOR: Seltzer, Larry
SOURCE: PC Magazine, v18 n5 p191(5) Mar 9, 1999
ISSN: 0888-8509
HOMEPAGE: <http://www.pcmag.com>

RECORD TYPE: Review
REVIEW TYPE: Review
GRADE: A

Excite's **Excite Auctions** and Yahoo!'s **Yahoo! Auctions**, along with **Auction Universe**, eBay, FirstAuction, and ONSALE's **atAuction** are compared Web **auction** sites. eBay is the editors' choice, with excellent marks in many areas evaluated. eBay has an astounding **number of items** for sale, a large, dedicated following who bid on items, and an excellent feature set. About a thousand product categories are listed, and testers could easily find any item wanted, including CPUs and Big Bertha golf clubs. Excite **Auctions** includes Excite's **auction** site with Classifieds2000's site, but the latter is not particularly user-friendly. Excite **Auctions**, like all the others except eBay, also has few bidders. FirstAuction's items for sale are more akin to goods found in a department store, and it is a good choice for deals on general merchandise, but ONSALE has a larger choice of **computing** equipment. FirstAuction's selection process is different from the others, since it provides six high-level category headings, and many items for sale are new. FirstAuction provides FlashAuction, or half-hour **auctions** of nine products held 14 times each day. Yahoo!'s **Auctions** categories look like the Yahoo! Portal/search engine's, but both Excite and Yahoo! have serious search problems.

COMPANY NAME: Excite@Home Inc (609951); Yahoo! Inc (610909); egghead.com
Superstores (639397); eBay Inc (658545)
SPECIAL FEATURE: Screen Layouts Tables

DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions** ; IBM PC & Compatibles; Internet Marketing;
Internet Shopping; Portals; Retailers; Sales Force Automation;
Wholesalers
REVISION DATE: 20010430

Set	Items	Description
S1	1	AU=(WURMAN P? OR WURMAN, P?)
S2	2611	AUCTION? OR META AUCTION? OR MULTIAUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR REVERSEAUCTION? OR INVERSEAUCTION
S3	1998582	ALGORITHM? OR ALGORYTHM? OR FORMULA? OR MECHANISM?
S4	1561574	PRICE? OR COST? OR CHARG? OR BID OR BIDS OR OFFER? ?
S5	1110616	INTERIM OR PROGRESSIVE? OR TEMPORAR? OR CURRENT?
S6	23100	WIN OR WINS OR WON OR WINNING
S7	1	S1 AND S2
S8	24839	(S6 OR S3) (10N) S4
S9	71	S8 (20N) S2
S10	9	S8 AND S5 AND S2
S11	72	S9 OR S10
S12	65	S11 AND IC=G06F-017/60

? show file

File 344:Chinese Patents Abs Aug 1985-2003/Apr

(c) 2003 European Patent Office

File 347:JAPIO Oct 1976-2003/Jun(Updated 031006)

(c) 2003 JPO & JAPIO

File 350:Derwent WPIX 1963-2003/UD,UM &UP=200365

(c) 2003 Thomson Derwent

File 371:French Patents 1961-2002/BOPI 200209

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Set	Items	Description
S1	1	AU=(WURMAN P? OR WURMAN, P?)
S2	2611	AUCTION? OR META AUCTION? OR MULTIAUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR REVERSEAUCTION? OR INVERSEAUCTION
S3	1998582	ALGORITHM? OR ALGORYTHM? OR FORMULA? OR MECHANISM?
S4	1284484	COMPUTES OR COMPUTING OR CALCULAT? OR COMPUTE OR DETERMIN? OR ALLOCAT? OR APPORTION?
S5	26130	(BUNDL? OR GROUP? ? OR COMPLIMENTAR? OR NUMBER OR COLLECTI- ON) (5N) (ITEM? ? OR PRODUCT? ? WARES OR EQUIPMENT? OR MERCHAND- I?)
S6	1561574	PRICE? OR COST? OR CHARG? OR BID OR BIDS OR OFFER? ?
S7	1110616	INTERIM OR PROGRESSIVE? OR TEMPORAR? OR CURRENT?
S8	23100	WIN OR WINS OR WON OR WINNING
S9	862	S4(10N)S5
S10	3	S9 AND S2
S11	27533	(BUNDL? OR GROUP? ? OR COMPLIMENTAR? OR NUMBER OR COLLECTI- ON) (5N) (COMMODIT? OR ITEM? ? OR PRODUCT? ? WARES OR EQUIPMENT? OR MERCHANDI?)
S12	4771	S11 AND (S6 OR BIDDER?)
S13	38	S12 AND S2
S14	32	S13 AND IC=G06F-017/60
S15	29	S14 NOT S10

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File 344:Chinese Patents Abs Aug 1985-2003/Apr

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File 347:JAPIO Oct 1976-2003/Jun(Updated 031006)

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File 350:Derwent WPIX 1963-2003/UD,UM &UP=200365

(c) 2003 Thomson Derwent

File 371:French Patents 1961-2002/BOPI 200209

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Set	Items	Description
S1	0	AU=(WURMAN P? OR WURMAN, P?)
S2	348549	AUCTION? OR METAUCTION? OR MULTIAUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR REVERSEAUCTION? OR INVERSEAUCTION
S3	744778	ALGORITHM? OR ALGORYTHM? OR FORMULA? OR MECHANISM?
S4	2567685	COMPUTES OR COMPUTING OR CALCULAT? OR COMPUTE OR DETERMIN? OR ALLOCAT? OR APPORTION?
S5	88924	(BUNDL? OR GROUP? ? OR COMPLIMENTAR? OR NUMBER OR COLLECTI- ON) (5N) (COMMODIT? OR ITEM? ? OR PRODUCT? ? WARES OR EQUIPMENT? OR MERCHANDI?)
S6	3750054	WIN OR WINS OR WON OR WINNING
S7	1284	S5(S)S2
S8	16	S7(20N) (S3 OR S4)
S9	68	S7(S)S6
S10	84	S8 OR S9
S11	49	S10 NOT PY>2000
S12	35	S11 NOT PD=20000417:20031010
S13	27	RD (unique items)

? show file

File 20:Dialog Global Reporter 1997-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 The Dialog Corp.

File 476:Financial Times Fulltext 1982-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 Financial Times Ltd

File 610:Business Wire 1999-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 Business Wire.

File 613:PR Newswire 1999-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 PR Newswire Association Inc

File 624:McGraw-Hill Publications 1985-2003/Oct 09
(c) 2003 McGraw-Hill Co. Inc

File 634:San Jose Mercury Jun 1985-2003/Oct 09
(c) 2003 San Jose Mercury News

File 810:Business Wire 1986-1999/Feb 28
(c) 1999 Business Wire

File 813:PR Newswire 1987-1999/Apr 30
(c) 1999 PR Newswire Association Inc

File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters 2003/Oct 09
(c) 2003 The Dialog Corp.

File 626:Bond Buyer Full Text 1981-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 Bond Buyer

Set	Items	Description
S1	1	AU={WURMAN P? OR WURMAN, P?}
S2	284740	AUCTION? OR METAUCTION? OR MULTIAUCTION? OR DUTCHAUTION? OR REVERSEAUCTION? OR INVERSEAUCTION
S3	1257944	ALGORITHM? OR ALGORYTHM? OR FORMULA? OR MECHANISM?
S4	3562916	COMPUTES OR COMPUTING OR CALCULAT? OR COMPUTE OR DETERMIN? OR ALLOCAT? OR APPORTION?
S5	162325	(BUNDL? OR GROUP? ? OR COMPLIMENTAR? OR NUMBER OR COLLECTI- ON) (5N) (COMMODIT? OR ITEM? ? OR PRODUCT? ? WARES OR EQUIPMENT? OR MERCHANDI?)
S6	15415378	PRICE? OR COST? OR CHARG? OR BID OR BIDS OR OFFER? ?
S7	2840510	WIN OR WINS OR WON OR WINNING
S8	2539	S4(10N)S5
S9	10	S8(S)S2
S10	1181	S5(S)S2
S11	215302	S6(5N) (S7 OR S3)
S12	46	S10(2S)S11
S13	56	S12 OR S9
S14	50	S13 NOT PY>2000
S15	44	S14 NOT PD=20000417:20031010
S16	22	RD (unique items)

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File 9:Business & Industry(R) Jul/1994-2003/Oct 09
(c) 2003 Resp. DB Svcs.

File 15:ABI/Inform(R) 1971-2003/Oct 09
(c) 2003 ProQuest Info&Learning

File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R) 1990-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 The Gale Group

File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB 1976-2003/Oct 10
(c)2003 The Gale Group

File 160:Gale Group PROMT(R) 1972-1989
(c) 1999 The Gale Group

File 275:Gale Group Computer DB(TM) 1983-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 The Gale Group

File 621:Gale Group New Prod.Annou.(R) 1985-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 The Gale Group

File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM) 1987-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 The Gale Group

File 625:American Banker Publications 1981-2003/Oct 10
(c) 2003 American Banker

File 268:Banking Info Source 1981-2003/Sep W4
(c) 2003 ProQuest Info&Learning